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Abstract
We investigate in a horizontal product di®erentiation model with
North-South trade the implications of a home bias in consumers'
demand for labelled goods. We compare mutual recognition and
international harmonisation of ecological labels with respect to
¯rms' pro¯ts and welfare. Northern consumers perceive a warm
glow from buying green, but have information problems with
imported labelled products. Firms di®er in labelling costs which
could help a Southern ¯rm to compensate for the home bias
under mutual recognition. Under harmonisation the home bias
disappears. Welfare analysis of harmonised labelling shows that
a Southern ¯rm gains from adopting a harmonised label { even
if there is "eco-imperialism". Given the speci¯c trade structure
in our model, harmonisation is a bene¯cial regime except for the
case that labelling costs reach a speci¯c treshold.
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Ecological labels help consumers to identify clean products with respect
to a whole range of environmental criteria relating to consumption and
production externalities. This makes them useful for the identi¯cation
of processes and production methods (PPMs) of products which { with
respect to their incorporated characteristics { are regarded as fully ho-
mogenous. Due to the rapid increase in trans-boundary and global en-
vironmental problems, there is a need to control for PPMs. Moreover,
labelling in general has become an important national environmental
policy tool.1 Most eco-labelling programmes operate with voluntary par-
ticipation of ¯rms and all of them rely on market forces. However, inter-
national trade rules established by the World Trade Organization (WTO)
do not allow governments to discriminate imports produced with envi-
ronmentally unfriendly PPMs as they have to be treated in the same
way as domestic 'like' products. Many exporting countries like Malaysia,
Indonesia, Brazil, or Columbia, have introduced ecological labels in the
1990s (Basu et al. 2003). These labels compete with labels introduced
in the importing countries for homogeneous products, such as timber,
°owers, or cotton. Thus, discrimination of goods could also relate to
the origin of the labelling programme. So far, in the WTO debate major
attention has been paid to the labels' potential for 'like' product discrim-
ination based on PPMs (Grote et al. 1999, Ahn and Ahn 2001, Melser
and Robertson 2005, Greaker 2006), which is re°ected also in the Doha
Mandate of WTO trade negotiations (Doha Declaration 2001). Little at-
tention has been paid to the competition between di®erent labels for the
same type of good and the consequences of information problems in ex-
port markets. Although homogeneous products carrying a foreign label
must not be rejected at the border if the label uses di®erent criteria than
those underlying the domestic labels for 'like' products, consumers tend
to prefer labels issued by domestic agencies. Thus, if labels should ful¯ll
the role of ¯ghting global pollution without compromising international
agreements, esp. trade rules (as pointed out by Teisl et al. 2002: 356,
Melser and Robertson 2005: 53, 57), acceptance of di®erent labels needs
1We refer to "the use of labels in order to inform consumers that a product is
determined by a third party to be environmentally more friendly relative to other
products in the same category" as de¯ned by the UNCTAD (1994). See also the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) de¯nition: "Type I is the eco-
seal awarded as a license and based on a labelling programme"(OECD 1997b: 9 f).
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some form of agreement, too.
There are two options available for treating labelled goods in inter-
national trade. Either, trading countries negotiate mutual recognition of
national labels or they negotiate a harmonised approach by introducing
a common label, e.g. for speci¯c products which could be regarded as
'like products' in WTO terms. While harmonisation would imply a sin-
gle labelling programme with a single labelling seal for all participating
countries, mutual recognition agreements (MRA) allow each nation to
keep the national labelling scheme with a national label. The trade con-
sequence from both regimes is identical when it comes to discrimination
at the border: neither products bearing a harmonised label nor products
bearing a foreign label under an MRA must not be denied market access.
Moreover, as we focus on the international trade dimension and WTO
regulation, the decision on both mutual recognition and harmonisation
needs negotiations at the governmental level as private organisations do
not have a mandate.
In this paper we look into the performance of either type of agree-
ment in terms of welfare if a Northern and a Southern country engage in
trading a homogeneous good. An important point in this respect is the
di®erent perception of trade in labelled goods in developed and in devel-
oping countries. On the one hand, in industrialised countries there are
two motivations for ecological labels. First, many consumers prefer green
goods and green production. Thus, they need information and they are
willing to pay a premium. Second, for policy makers, labels indirectly
help to set green standards. On the other hand, for developing countries
the demand for green goods could bring along higher and costly stan-
dards. In order to consider their local and technological conditions they
have an incentive to implement own labels for exports to markets with
'green' demand. Yet, as the labelling criteria set by importing countries
could become technical standards which are beyond the scope of national
policy, exporters and governments from the South fear a high potential
for protectionism from Northern labels to which consumers ascribe a
higher credibility.
Moreover, we ask how the strictness of labels varies if national labels
would be mutually recognised or harmonised at the international level.
The criteria could di®er widely under mutual recognition if handled as
under current WTO-rules. This changes under harmonisation as every
producer who wants to acquire a label needs to follow international la-
belling criteria which are set by some kind of international institution.
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For the implementation, a number of practical issues arise, which we
will not address. To mention but a few, labels could be either based
on broad life-cycle-analyses or on selected criteria. For the production
of homogeneous goods one can implement single-subject labels (e.g. the
FSC-Forrest Stewardship Council label for timber). Currently, the most
common labelling approach is the use of multi-subject labels, which ap-
ply to a variety of products and which are installed as national labelling
programmes like the Green Seal in the USA or the Blue Angel in Ger-
many.
Basically two dimensions exist that describe product di®erentiation
between goods, a horizontal and a vertical one. Each dimension is char-
acterised by consumers' preferences (Neven and Thisse, 1990; Beath and
Katsoulacos 1991). Two products di®er in the horizontal dimension when
there is no ranking among consumers based on their willingness to pay for
the two goods, but the spatial proximity of goods to consumers' tastes
matter. There is vertical product di®erentiation if goods are ranked
according to the consumers' willingness to pay for quality (Neven and
Thisse 1990: 175f). We apply a model of horizontal product di®erentia-
tion in the Hotelling (1929) tradition and as in Eriksson (2004), where all
consumers reveal the same willingness to pay. This re°ects a country's
average willingness to pay for environmental friendliness, which di®ers
between developed and developing countries.
We also take into account that consumers experience 'impure altru-
ism' as de¯ned by Andreoni (1989, 1990). This means that they experi-
ence a warm glow from contributing to environmental protection, leading
to a higher willingness to pay for green goods and an incentive for ¯rms to
adopt a label. Moreover, we analyse a situation where consumers reveal a
'home bias' with respect to a Northern label, meaning that they discrim-
inate Southern products due to asymmetries in information about the
credibility of the Southern label. Consumers choose the product which
they feel is located in a horizontal dimension closest to their taste. With-
out labelling, this is determined only by the origin of a ¯rm, North or
South. A label explicitly adds the environmental quality dimension to
this localisation. However, unlike in Eriksson (2004), this does not imply
that products are at di®erent ends of a quality scale. Rather, with the
labels applied, consumers perception of the products environmental char-
acteristics depends on the label as such, and on the origin of that label.
Thus, the label is part of the taste dimension related to a homogeneous
good.
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Instead of comparing an autarky scenario to a trade scenario { as can
be found in Jansen and de Faria (2002) or MÄ akÄ onen (2005) { we assume
that the Southern ¯rm exports all its output to the domestic market. We
¯nd that under mutual recognition each ¯rm would choose a labelling
level which optimises its pro¯ts, and that the Northern policy maker
under this regime would also choose these labelling criteria. Moreover,
we show that an adoption of a label is always a dominant strategy in
our setting. Even the application of the importing country's label to the
exporting country's ¯rm ("eco-imperialism") could be optimal for the
Southern ¯rm.
Welfare analysis of a harmonised labelling programme shows that a
social planner would set stricter labelling criteria compared to the mu-
tual recognition case if the di®erence in labelling costs is su±ciently large.
Stronger labelling standards help to increase pro¯ts and market share of
the 'cheaper' ¯rm. Jansen and de Faria (2002) as well as MÄ akÄ onen (2005)
arrive at di®erent results in models of vertical product di®erentiation. In
their studies, mutual recognition can drive high quality out of the market
due to adverse selection. We do not con¯rm this. Under mutual recogni-
tion, the Southern ¯rm can compensate the home bias via labelling costs.
This could support a self-ful¯ling prophecy of the Northern consumers'
prejudice concerning a Southern countries labelling quality. Under har-
monisation and depending on the cost di®erentials between ¯rms, an
e±cient outcome could be that the social planner sets the criteria for the
common label at such a level that the cheaper ¯rm takes over the whole
market.
In the next chapter, we analyse mutual recognition and harmonisation
in three steps. First, we show the market equilibrium and welfare for a
unilateral introduction of a label in the North. Second, we investigate
mutual recognition of labels in both countries. Third, we turn to welfare
results for harmonisation of labels at the international level. Chapter 3
summarises and concludes.
2 North-South trade in labelled goods: a
model
Trade between industrialised and developing countries has speci¯c char-
acteristics, for example a high export dependency by developing coun-
tries with respect to a few speci¯c product groups (e.g. natural resources,
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agricultural products). Moreover, many Southern exporters have a deep
mistrust against any environmental requirement related to traded prod-
ucts. Nevertheless, labels are known as one of the least trade restrictive
tools and, thus, are the lowest common denominator when it comes to
making transparent the social and environmental production methods in
countries of origin. Especially in the industrialised countries this tool has
a long tradition, and an increasing number of less developed countries
introduces labels, too.
Labels enable producers to di®erentiate their products in two dimen-
sions. Either labels help to indicate (environmental) quality, that is prod-
ucts are vertically di®erentiated and consumers can rank them according
to their tastes for quality. Or labels help to di®erentiate products in
a horizontal manner, meaning that product characteristics are 'located'
close to consumers tastes without any ranking of consumers' willingness-
to-pay for the di®erent types (Tirole 1989; Neven and Thisse 1990, 175f).
For the analysis of non-product-related labelling, the latter di®erentia-
tion is relevant, as by assumption the environmental e®ect is related to
production and it is not re°ected in the product's quality. As we assume
that consumers have information problems with respect to the Southern
¯rm, the labels add another identi¯cation mark to the products origin.
As consumers have a bene¯t from buying labelled instead of unlabelled
goods, the label a®ects the consumers location, prices and pro¯ts.
We illustrate the e®ect of labels in three steps. First, only the home
(Northern) country introduces a label, a, which the ¯rm would adopt as
long as this leads to positive pro¯ts, i.e. as long as the extra revenue is
not overcompensated by extra production cost (e.g. process innovation,
bureaucracy, monitoring). Second, we consider that both ¯rms use a
label in order to increase market shares. With labelling, ¯rms' products
are di®erentiated not only through location (Northern and Southern) but
also through ecological labels (labelled and non-labelled), while products
are still physically homogenous. If only one ¯rm introduces a label, this
opens up a di®erentiation with respect to the perceived environmental
"quality" of the good (the PPMs).2 Third, we ask how a harmonisation
of labelling regimes a®ects welfare and the level of labels.
We do not include a quality dimension, because we do not consider
any consumer ranking. Instead, we assume that all of the consumers pre-
fer clean production in the same way (assuming to represent a country's
2For a combination of the vertical and the horizontal di®erentiation dimensions in
one model see Neven and Thisse (1990).
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attitude to the environment), i.e. there is no separation of the market
depending on horizontal or vertical domination (Greaker 2006, Neven
and Thisse 1990). Sticking to the simple horizontal di®erentiation means
that only in the case in which the Southern ¯rm does not use a label
do ¯rms di®er in both location and labelling. In our model, national
labels simply add a characteristic to location; this assumption enables
us to isolate one of the major problems of developing countries' labels,
namely that they face a home bias of consumers in the export market.
A home bias means that Northern consumers prefer the Northern label
over the Southern one. A home bias is motivated by information prob-
lems with respect to the labelling criteria abroad, the reliability of the
labelling system (e.g. monitoring), a credibility bonus for the Northern
¯rm based on the consumers' perception, e.g. because of long-standing
labelling experiences in the North, where a combination of labelling and
environmental management certi¯cation systems have led to a low level
of monitoring failure. If, however, the governments decide to introduce
a harmonised single subject label, and both ¯rms accept this tool, the
¯rms' di®erentiation stems solely from the costs of labelling.3
2.1 Introducing a label in the North
We start with a simple model of spatial product di®erentiation and a
duopolistic market on which two ¯rms - a Northern producer and a
Southern one - compete in prices. Firms are di®erentiated by their lo-
cation and although their products are fully homogenous, the location
leads to a di®erentiation in the spatial dimension, because consumers
face transportation cost. Following the horizontal di®erentiation model
of Hotelling (1929), we assume that consumers and products are located
along a line of potential locations. The producers are located along the
unit intervall at 0 (Northern ¯rm) and 1 (Southern ¯rm), whereas con-
sumers are uniformly distributed over the unit intervall. Consumers have
individual tastes for products. They make their decisions in a rational
manner, comparing prices of goods with the proximity of goods to their
ideal location. Accordingly, a market equilibrium is determined by the
goods' prices, the distribution of consumers, the price, and the location
of the rival product. We also assume that the Southern ¯rm produces
only for the Northern market, i.e. it exports all its output. Each con-
3Basu et al. (2004: 136) pronounce that in segmented markets the credibility
problem of labelling programs "is key to the determination of the green premium".
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sumer x wants to buy one unit of the product q, i.e. demand is inelastic.
Consumer x 2 [0;1] has a willingness to pay for a good q of
º(q;x) = s + b(a) ¡ tx
2: (1)
where s is the gross utility from consuming q (assumed to be large enough
so that all consumers buy), t is the cost each consumer faces when buy-
ing in di®erent locations (transport cost), which we normalise to 1 to
keep notation simple. b(a) is the individual bene¯t from contributing to
the environment, depending on the actual label chosen, with b(0) = 0,
b0(a) > 0 and b00(a) < 0. a represents the ecological labelling scheme
which includes abatement technology, but also other criteria (e.g. audit-
ing, process innovation, technological innovation or waste management).
Labels can be chosen from the possibility set A = [amin;amax], where amin
denotes minimal ecological requirements that have to be met to induce
a positive willingness to pay, and amax denotes the maximal ecological
requirements for which consumers are willing to pay. We do not assume
that there is a direct impact in consumer utility (or social welfare) from a
"greener" production. Rather, consumers want to contribute to a better
environment in general, regardless of their individual bene¯t.4
The model consists of a three stage game. In the ¯rst stage, the
Northern government chooses a labelling scheme aN 2 A. In the second
stage, the Northern ¯rm decides upon adopting the label or not. In
the third stage, both ¯rms set their prices in a non-cooperative manner.
The Northern ¯rms' cost function is C1(q1;a) = (c + c1(a))q1, with c
representing constant marginal costs and c1(a) labelling costs. For the
latter, we assume c1(0) = 0, c0
1 > 0 and c00
1 > 0. Labelling costs c(a)
include all relevant aspects of labelling at the ¯rm level (e.g. process
innovation, bureaucracy, monitoring). The Southern ¯rms' cost function
is C2(q2) = cq2, i.e. there are no di®erences in production costs. To
simplify notation, production costs are normalised to 0.
We start with calculating the market equilibrium and ¯rms' equilib-
rium pro¯ts in the third stage. Utility of consumer x when buying from
the Northern ¯rm at 0 is de¯ned as
4Examples for such an environmental awareness are concerns about animal welfare
in agricultural production or contributions to a global public good, of which the
bene¯ts occur only over a long time period or in a di®erent location. Moreover, also
requirements which have an impact only on a small regional scale in a distant country
are relevant here, e.g. farming methods abroad.
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U
0
x(q1;x) = s + b(a
N) ¡ x
2 ¡ p1: (2)




x(q2;x) = s ¡ (1 ¡ x)
2 ¡ p2: (3)
In order to determine the demand for each ¯rm, we need to ¯nd
the indi®erent consumer, ^ x 2 [0;1] - with superscript n indicating the




b(aN) + p2 ¡ p1 + 1
2
(4)
Consumers who are located at x < ^ x buy from ¯rm 1 and consumers
located at x > ^ x buy from ¯rm 2. Demand functions for the two ¯rms
thus are
D1(p1;p2) = ^ x; (5)
D2(p1;p2) = 1 ¡ ^ x: (6)
As can easily be seen, without labelling identical prices would place the
indi®erent consumer at 1=2. With labelling, more consumers buy from
the Northern ¯rm located at 0, and it is conceivable that with identical
prices the Northern ¯rm attracts all the demand if the consumers' bene¯t
is large enough. We ¯nd that ^ x = 1 if b(aN) = 1. That is, if the bene¯t
from buying the labelled good equals the transportation cost of buying
from ¯rm 1, the Northern ¯rm attracts all demand. Thus, if prices do
not di®er, the Southern ¯rm can only sell its product if the warm glow
from buying the labelled good does not compensate for transportation
cost, i.e. (1 ¡ ^ xn) > 0 if b(aN) < 1.
In order to ¯nd the market equilibrium we need the Nash equilibrium
for price competition. Pro¯ts of the Northern and the Southern ¯rm are
¼1 = (p1 ¡ c1(a
N))D1(p1;p2); ¼2 = p2D2(p1;p2); (7)























N) + 1] (9)
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The reaction functions show that ¯rms pricing behaviour depends on
the bene¯t consumers derive from Northern labelling. The Southern ¯rm
decreases its price if the bene¯t from the Northern label increases, while
the Northern ¯rm will use the bene¯t for an increase in the product's
price. These reaction functions yield the equilibrium prices
p
¤n





































which determines demand for the Southern ¯rm. Inserting (12) and








































Next we turn to the second stage. The Northern ¯rm will adopt the
label if adoption increases its pro¯ts compared to the situation without
labelling. In the latter case, its pro¯ts are 1=2. Equation (12) shows that
labelling increases pro¯ts if b(aN) > c1(aN), i.e. if the willingness to pay
for a label is larger than the costs of labelling.
In the ¯rst stage, governments maximise welfare. The welfare in the
Northern country includes the Northern ¯rm's pro¯ts (¼¤n
1 ), and the con-
sumer surplus which consists of net consumer surplus (CSnet), the warm
glow e®ect (WG), and transportation cost (TC), which each consumer
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experiences as a disutility from the location of the two goods at either







net + WG ¡ TC; (16)
with CSn
net = s ¡ p¤n
1 x¤n ¡ p¤n





x¤n(1 ¡ y)2dy = 1
3 + (x¤n)2 ¡ x¤n.
Inserting the results from (10) to (14) in (16) and using the constant



































d)) = 0 (18)
.
This implies b0(aN) = c0(aN), i.e. the marginal willingness to pay for
the labelled good must equal the marginal labelling costs of the ¯rm.
The welfare maximising label is identical to the one chosen at the





@aN = 0 , b0(aN) = c0(aN). This result is based on two assump-
tions. First, all consumers have the same willingness to pay for labelled
products, and marginal bene¯t equals average bene¯t from consuming a
labelled good. Therefore the label that maximises monopoly pro¯ts is
the same as the welfare maximising one (Spence 1975).6 Second, we have
not included any social costs in the welfare function.7
Proposition 1. If b(aN) > c1(aN), the introduction of a labelling scheme
increases the market share and the pro¯t of the Northern ¯rm at the
expense of the Southern ¯rm.
5As mentioned before, to simplify the analysis we do not assume that labelling
increases welfare via the reduction of negative environmental externalities. Therefore,
we analyse labels which have a perceived environmental impact, but not a measurable
one.
6Under the assumption that all consumers have the same willingness to pay for
quality, Spence (1975) has analysed the quality choice of a ¯rm and has shown that the
quality chosen by a pro¯t maximising monopolist is identical to the welfare maximising
quality, since then the marginal bene¯t of quality equals the average bene¯t.
7If a negative externality is included in the welfare function, the condition for
a welfare maximum will be that the marginal costs of labelling have to equal the
marginal disutility from pollution. See e.g. Eriksson (2004: 286).
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Proof. Due to our symmetry assumptions, in the Bertrand competition
equilibrium without labelling there are equal market shares (1/2), equal
prices (p¤
1 = p¤
2 = 1) and equal pro¯ts (¼¤
1 = ¼¤
2 = 1
2). Proposition 1 can
be seen directly from comparing (12) and (14) with these values.
Compared to the case without labelling, the Northern demand has
increased by 1
6[b(aN ¡ c1(aN)]. If 1
6[b(aN ¡ c1(aN)] > 3, all demand is
directed to the Northern ¯rm.
2.2 Labelling in both countries with mutual recog-
nition
If we consider that both countries introduce a label, there are two po-
tential ways to regulate the international trade in labelled goods. Either
countries agree on mutual recognition or on harmonisation.8 We inves-
tigate ¯rst a situation with mutual recognition. We consider a situation
where countries take the labelling policy of other countries as given and
do not stipulate any import rules for labelled or unlabelled 'like products'.
Introducing a label for the export good enables also the Southern ¯rm
to signal an environmentally friendly production and to gain from the
consumers' willingness to pay. A Southern label could (re)gain market
shares which would be lost if only the North introduces a labelling policy.
However, we also assume that Northern consumers have a home bias,
i.e. although they feel a bene¯t from buying a labelled Southern good
instead of an unlabelled one, this bene¯t could be very low due to lack
of credibility and consumers perceive a higher bene¯t from the home
label. The home bias is expressed in terms of the di®erence between
the bene¯ts consumers experience from buying a labelled Northern and
a labelled Southern good. Thus, b(aN) ¡ b(aS) > 0 if aN = aS. This
de¯nition would imply that the Southern ¯rm could compensate for the
home bias by choosing a higher labelling level. A stronger de¯nition of
the home bias would be that b(aN) ¡ b(aS) > 0 8 aN;aS 2 A. With
the strong de¯nition, even with the highest labelling standard applied
in the South, consumers experience a lower bene¯t from the Southern
compared to the Northern product. In the following, we assume the
strong de¯nition.
8Currently, neither agreement is prevalent under WTO rules, and as a matter of
fact, labelled goods cross borders without explicit rules.
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The critical consumer ^ xm is indi®erent between buying from the
Northern or from the Southern ¯rm if governments choose to mutually
accept the labels, superscript m indicating this situation. Utility from
the domestic goods is
U
0
x(q1;x) = s + b(a
N) ¡ x
2 ¡ p1 (19)
and utility from buying the Southern good is
U
1
x(q2;x) = s + b(a
S) ¡ (1 ¡ x)
2 ¡ p2 (20)
Equating (19) and (20) allows to solve for ^ xm:
^ x
m =
b(aN) ¡ b(aS) + p2 ¡ p1 + 1
2
: (21)
If we assume that p1 = p2, consumers would split their demand be-
tween the two ¯rms according to the di®erences in bene¯ts from labelling.
However, the di®erence in willingness to pay and in labelling costs will
in°uence the equilibrium prices. The critical consumer is determined by
both, price di®erences and di®erences in environmental bene¯ts and the
trade-o® between the two characteristics.
Starting again with the third stage, ¯rms' pro¯ts are
¼1 = (p1 ¡ c1(a
N))D1(p1;p2); ¼2 = (p2 ¡ c2(a
S))D2(p1;p2): (22)




















N) + 3] (24)
Firm 1's equilibrium price increases with the bene¯t consumers ex-
perience from domestic labels and decreases the more consumers value
the Southern label. For ¯rm 2, the inverse holds, meaning that the home
bias in°uences the pricing behaviour of the two ¯rms. Moreover, also
the costs of labelling lead to an increase in prices for both ¯rms, with a
higher impact from the country's own label. The location of the critical
consumer is now:
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The demand for the Northern ¯rm depends upon the trade-o® be-
tween the home bias and the di®erence in labelling costs. If ¯ ´
b(aN) ¡ b(aS) > 0 denotes the home bias and ° ´ c2(aS) ¡ c1(aN) de-
notes the cost di®erential, (25) shows that ¯ shifts demand in favour of
the Northern ¯rm, and that ° shifts demand in either direction depending
on the algebraic sign.































Not surprisingly, the Northern ¯rm's pro¯t rises and the Southern
¯rm's pro¯t falls with the home bias. Moreover, the Northern pro¯t rises
with the Southern labelling cost and vice versa.
In the second stage, ¯rms will adopt the label if this increases their








In the ¯rst stage, governments choose independently the labelling re-
quirements by maximising national welfare. As before, Northern welfare
consists of pro¯ts, consumer surplus, warm glow e®ects and travelling
costs, with warm glow being now WG = b(aN)x¤n + b(aS)(1 ¡ x¤n). In-
serting the relevant equations and maximising with respect to aN again
yields b0(aN) = c0(aN) as a necessary condition. Southern welfare is as-
sumed to consist only of the Southern ¯rm's pro¯ts, maximising yields
b0(aS) = c0(aS) as a necessary condition.
Proposition 2. If b(aS) > c2(aS), the Southern ¯rm gains from the
introduction of a Southern label. Compared to the equilibrium without
labelling, it can increase its market share and pro¯t only if it has a positive
and su±ciently high cost advantage (¡° > ¯ > 0). For the market
equilibrium, three regions can be distinguished, with both ¯rms active only
if ¡3 ¡ ° < ¯ < 3 ¡ °.
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Proof. The ¯rst sentence follows from comparing (26) with (13). The
second from comparing (28) with 1=2. From (25) follows that 0 < ^ xm < 1
requires ¡3 ¡ ° < ¯ < 3 ¡ °.
We demonstrate the trade-o® between home bias and cost di®erential
in ¯gure 1. It shows three regions. In region I, the home bias is small
and the cost di®erential leads consumers to buy only from the Southern
¯rm. In region II, there is horizontal product di®erentiation between the
two ¯rms and consumers buy both varieties. In region III, consumers
buy only from the Northern ¯rm, because there is a large home bias,
compared to the cost di®erence.
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As a result we ¯nd that for the market equilibrium, the introduction
of the Southern label does not automatically lead to a symmetric situ-
ation, because consumers in the North do not regard the two labels as
being equivalent. For the Southern ¯rm, the only way to compensate
for the loss in market share caused by the home bias is to compete via
the labelling costs. Only if the Southern ¯rm's labelling programme is
su±ciently cheaper than the Northern one, it could keep the benchmark
market share (no labelling, pro¯ts = 1=2), or increase it. The problem is
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that these national labels will in general not maximise worldwide welfare.
On the one hand, di®erences in labelling costs are a comparative advan-
tage, therefore production of labelled products should be shifted into the
country with the lower costs. This tendency is dampened by the fact that
a shift of production increases transport costs. On the other hand, con-
sumer preferences are distorted due to informational constraints. Even
if both labelling regimes are equal from a technical point of view, the
perceived utility could di®er. One way to handle this problem would be
to give Northern consumers more reliable information about Southern
production conditions by harmonising labelling requirements in a uni¯ed
labelling programme.
2.3 Harmonisation of labels
A harmonisation of labelling programmes would need either close co-
operation of national policy makers or an international institution that
decides on the labelling programme and criteria. Harmonisation could
induce either a lower or a higher level of labelling criteria. If there was an
international social planner who had all relevant information, she could
set the optimal labelling requirements with respect to world welfare. Ac-
tually, an international standard setting institution could be closest to
this theoretical solution (like the ISO, taking care of technical standards
or the Forest Stewardship Council, taking care of timber labelling). This
institution could decide on a labelling programme and then assist na-
tional governments in implementation. If this solution is not feasible,
national governments could engage in negotiations about labels for homo-
geneous goods - then it is a matter of the negotiation framework whether
agreement leads to higher or lower than average criteria.
In the horizontal di®erentiation model, we assume that a harmonised
single subject label provides to the Northern consumer more credible
information with respect to the imported labelled good. Consumers no
longer can distinguish a product according to the origin of its label.
Harmonisation would bring about a single label, ¹ a, for both products,
Northern and Southern. As before, consumers feel they bene¯t from the
label that certi¯es an environmentally friendly production method, but
now there is no home bias. Instead, there is a symmetric situation in
consumers' demand. Consumers' bene¯t from labels is now expressed by
b(¹ a). Utility from the Northern good is now
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U
0
x(q1;x) = s + b(¹ a) ¡ x
2 ¡ p1 (29)
and utility from buying the Southern good is
U
1
x(q2;x) = s + b(¹ a) ¡ (1 ¡ x)
2 ¡ p2: (30)













(3 + c1(¹ a) + 2c2(¹ a)): (32)
The di®erence in prices now depends on the costs of labelling, ci(¹ a) .








(c2(¹ a) ¡ c1(¹ a)); (33)
who determines the demand for the Northern ¯rm's product, and
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Obviously, the di®erence between the two ¯rms and the market equi-
librium now depends on the costs of the harmonised label. In the
Hotelling model, the assumption of identical production cost is impor-
tant to focus on consumer preferences and their e®ect on the market
equilibrium. Here, we consider instead the e®ects which occur if the
labelling regime entails a cost di®erence, while preferences are not af-
fected (as the home bias disappears). Thus, there are three cases. First,
if c1(¹ a) = c2(¹ a), harmonisation leads to a symmetric situation in the
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market. Firms have identical market shares and pro¯ts, as in the basic
model without labelling. Second, if c1(¹ a) < c2(¹ a) the Northern ¯rm has
lower costs from labelling than the Southern ¯rm. This cost advantage
a®ects prices and pro¯ts. From (31) and (32) it can be seen that the
Northern ¯rm increases its price to a lower degree than the Southern
¯rm and thus increases its market share and pro¯ts, see (33) to (36).
Third, if c1(¹ a) > c2(¹ a) the Southern ¯rm will attract more demand and
gain higher pro¯ts. The pro¯t functions (35) and (36) illustrate the two
e®ects clearly: the ¯rst term is the benchmark pro¯t (1=2), the second
term is the pro¯t gain from the price reactions, which is always positive,
and the third term depends on which ¯rm has the lower costs. If there
is a cost disadvantage, the third term overcompensates the second term,
leading to a lower pro¯t than the benchmark.
In the second stage, ¯rms choose simultaneously whether to adopt
the label or not. For this decision, they compare their pro¯ts under
multilateral, under unilateral adoption and under non-adoption. If none
adopts, pro¯ts are 1=2 for each. If only the Northern ¯rm adopts, its
market share is given by x = 1
2 + 1
6[b(¹ a)¡c1(¹ a)], in the case that only the
Southern ¯rm adopts, its market share is (1 ¡ x) = 1
2 + 1
6[b(¹ a) ¡ c2(¹ a)]
(see (13)). If both adopt, pro¯ts are given in (35) and (36).
Proposition 3. If b(¹ a) > ci(¹ a), i = 1;2, adopting the label is a dominant
strategy.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume that c1(a) < c2(a). It is
evident from (33) to (36) that the Northern ¯rm gains from adopting the
label independently of Southern's decision. If the Southern ¯rm adopts
too, its market share is given by (34). If it decides not to adopt, its
market share is 1 ¡ x = 1
2 ¡ 1
6[b(¹ a) ¡ c1(¹ a)]. Thus, adoption yields a
higher market share if b(¹ a) > c2(¹ a). This condition is also su±cient
for adoption by the Southern ¯rm if the Northern ¯rm does not adopt.
Therefore, adopting is a dominant strategy even for the ¯rm with the
higher labelling costs.
In the ¯rst stage, the two governments negotiate about the level of the
harmonised label. Whether the harmonised label has stricter or weaker
labelling requirements than the national labels cannot be said without
modelling the negotiation process in detail. One way is to assume that the
labels applied independently under mutual recognition, aN and aS, serve
as upper and lower bounds for the negotiations (depending on which one
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actually is higher or lower). Then the harmonised label will be somewhere
in between the two independent labels. In this case, the negotiated label
is a compromise solution. If the Northern ¯rm has a cost advantage,
c1(a) < c2(a), the Northern label will serve as an upper bound, since
aN > aS: If the Southern ¯rm has a cost advantage, the reverse situation
could arise if cost-di®erences are large enough.
A corner solution would be to use the Northern label as the har-
monised label. This has been coined "eco imperialism". The crucial
point about this solution is that Southern governments may be forced
to adopt labels from export partners that do not match the economic
conditions in the South. Yet, in our analytical setup the Southern ¯rm
nevertheless would gain from adopting such a label. As a harmonisation
neutralises the home bias, it can be shown that adopting the Northern
label could actually be a simple and pro¯table strategy (compared to
the mutual recognition regime) for the Southern government, even if this
label will not maximise the pro¯t of the Southern ¯rm and therefore
Southern welfare.
Proposition 4. If the Northern label is used as the harmonised label and
a) if labelling costs are equal, c1(a) = c2(a), the Southern ¯rm gains by
adopting the Northern label.
b) if the Southern ¯rm has higher labelling costs, c1(a) < c2(a), the South-
ern ¯rm gains only if the cost di®erence is lower than the prior home bias,
¯ > c2(aN) ¡ c2(aS).
c) if the Southern label is higher under mutual recognition, aN < aS, the
Southern ¯rm always gains from adopting the Northern label.
Proof. a) With c1(a) = c2(a), and given the home bias b(aN)¡b(aS) > 0,
the Northern label is the higher label under mutual recognition, aN > aS.
If the home bias disappears, adopting the Northern label aN maximises
the Southern ¯rms' pro¯ts.
b) With c1(a) < c2(a), again aN > aS under mutual recognition. The
pro¯t under mutual recognition is ¼¤m
2 = 1
18[3 ¡ ¯ + c1(aN)) ¡ c2(aS))]2
(see (28)). The pro¯t with a harmonised label ¹ a = aN is given by
¼h
2(aN) = 1
18(3 + c1(aN) ¡ c2(aN))2. ¯ > c2(aN) ¡ c2(aS) is su±cient for
¼h
2(aN) > ¼¤m
2 , since then the additional costs from choosing a stricter
label do not (over)compensate the extra bene¯t from a higher market
share due to the abolition of a home bias.
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c) If aS > aN this implies c2(aN) ¡ c2(aS) < 0 and therefore ¯ > 0 >
c2(aN) ¡ c2(aS) always holds.
The idea behind proposition 4c) is that aS > aN implies a cost advan-
tage of the Southern ¯rm: With mutual recognition, b0(aS) = c0
2(aS) <
c0
1(aN) = b0(aN), and as we have assumed strict convexity, this implies
c2(aS) < c1(aN) and c2(a) < c1(a) 8a. By adopting the lower Northern
label, the Southern ¯rm gains from the lack of the home bias and from a
reduction in labelling costs, despite the fact that the lower label will not
maximise its pro¯ts under harmonisation.
Another solution for the negotiation process would be that the gov-
ernments maximise common welfare. For a social planner at the inter-
national level, the labels chosen under mutual recognition (aN;aS) no
longer serve as a political constraint or as upper/lower bounds for har-









h ¡ TC (37)
for which we get
W
h = ¾
h + b(¹ a) +
5
36




(c1(¹ a) + c2(¹ a)) (38)
with ¾h = s ¡ c ¡ 1
12.
With the e±cient solution, harmonisation does not necessarily imply
a compromise solution, i.e. a label ¹ a that is in the range between the
mutual recognition labels. Now it is conceivable that the harmonised
label is even stricter than the upper bound mutual recognition label.
Proposition 5. If the harmonised label, ¹ a, is chosen e±ciently,
a) and c1(a) > c2(a) (i.e the Southern ¯rm has a cost advantage),
then the e±cient label is always stricter than the Northern label under
mutual recognition, and it is stricter than the Southern label under mutual
recognition if c1(¹ a) ¡ c2(¹ a) > 18
10
b) and c1(a) < c2(a) (i.e the Northern ¯rm has a cost advantage), then
the e±cient label is always stricter than the Southern label with mutual
recognition, and it is stricter than the Northern label if c2(¹ a)¡c1(¹ a) > 18
10
c) and ¡3 < c2(¹ a) ¡ c1(¹ a) < 3, then the e±cient label is chosen such
that it drives the ¯rm with the higher labelling costs out of the market.
The Proof is given in the appendix.
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As the social planner takes into account both ¯rms' pro¯ts, pro¯t
shifting does no longer a®ect the welfare negatively and does not restrict
the choice of the harmonised label. Compared to the situation where
the two governments negotiate the harmonised label and use the mutual
recognition labels as upper/lower bounds, we can conclude:
Corollary 1. If in the negotiations about harmonisation, the labels cho-
sen under mutual recognition are setting an upper bound for ¹ a, and if
the cost di®erences are su±ciently large (as outlined in proposition 5),
the negotiated harmonised label will be ine±cient from a welfare point of
view.
For this result it is crucial to assume a situation where the negoti-
ating parties depart from independent labelling policies and where the
Northern party is not willing to subscribe to a stricter label than aN.
The Northern country has a simple reason for this behaviour. It would
loose twice: the home bias would disappear and labelling costs would
increase. The social planner, though, would not be restricted by these
bounds. Her decision would be based on the ¯rms' cost structures, and
she could choose a higher label that induces production to shift to the
country with the lower costs.
A more intuitive interpretation of this result starts with the ¯rst order












(c1(¹ a) ¡ c2(¹ a))(c
0
1(¹ a) ¡ c
0
2(¹ a)) (39)
On the RHS of this equation, the marginal costs of labelling consist of
production costs and transportation costs. The welfare function (38) can
be rearranged to show these costs explicitly (see appendix). Therefore,
the social planner faces the trade-o® between welfare gains from shifting
production to the region with lower labelling costs and the additional
transportation costs caused by this shift. Shifting production is possi-
ble by increasing labelling requirements. The welfare maximising label
implies a shift in production if the reduction in labelling costs is higher
than the increase in transportation costs.
The benchmark for our interpretation on the choice of an e±cient
harmonised label is c1(¹ a) = c2(¹ a). In this case we have b0(¹ a) = c0(¹ a)
as can be seen from (39). This implies, of course, that the choice of the
Northern mutual recognition label, aN as the harmonised label is e±cient
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{ as elaborated in proposition 5. If, however, c1(¹ a) < c2(¹ a), the Northern
¯rm has a cost advantage. If the su±cient condition in proposition (5b)
is ful¯lled, total costs of labelling decrease by shifting production to the
North, since the reduction in production costs is higher than the increase
in travelling costs. However, if the RHS of (39) decreases compared
to the benchmark, marginal bene¯ts from labelling must decrease, too,
requiring a higher labelling level than in the benchmark with equal costs.
We can illustrate the welfare e®ects by using a simple numerical ex-
ample, which we have elaborated in the appendix. The cost functions in
the North and in the South are c1(¹ a) =
(¹ a)2
2 and c2(¹ a) = À
(¹ a)2
2 and with
ci(0) = 0, c0
i > 0 and c00
i > 0. À determines the degree of cost di®erences
between labelling activities in the two countries. If both countries intro-
duce labels, there are three cases for the cost functions, depending on
the cost parameter À.
1. 0 < À < 1 ) c1(¹ a) > c2(¹ a)
2. À = 1 ) c1(¹ a) = c2(¹ a)
3. 1 < À < 2 ) c1(¹ a) > c2(¹ a)
We have for the social planner's warm glow WGh = b(¹ a) =
p
¹ a, and
inserting the relevant numbers into (38) we have
W
h = ¾










(1 + À): (40)
The welfare maximising label ¹ a¤ depends on the cost di®erence À
between North and South caused by a labelling programme. Moreover
¯rms' pro¯ts must not become negative.
Taking the case of À = 1 as a benchmark, ¯gure 2 illustrates the
welfare for identical labelling costs and for a 10 per cent cost advantage
of the Southern ¯rm À = 0:9.
We ¯nd that welfare increases if one ¯rm has a cost advantage (upper
line). The welfare maximising label in case of identical labelling costs in
North and South, À = 1, is ¹ a¤ = 1
2
2
3 ¼ 0:63. With a cost advantage of 10
per cent, the optimal labelling would yield ¹ a¤ ¼ 0:65.
2.4 Discussion of results
In our model of horizontal product di®erentiation we ¯nd that under
mutual recognition of a Northern and a Southern label, the e®ects of
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Figure 2: Welfare Comparison
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labelling on ¯rms' market shares and welfare depend on how consumers
value the information given by the labels, and on the costs the labelling
programme imposes on the producers. A home bias of consumers leads
to discrimination in the market and can only be compensated for by low
labelling costs of the Southern producer. Thus, the Northern ¯rm has
the higher market share as long as the home bias is not outperformed
by cost advantages of the Southern competitor. Moreover, for low la-
belling costs in the South there exists a critical value of the home bias
up to which the Southern pro¯ts can be higher than the Northern one.
However, this is only a small range of parameter values. As the South-
ern ¯rm has to outperform the home bias, the incentive to cheat with
respect to labelling criteria is considerable. The home bias could lead to
a self-ful¯lling prophecy: the Southern label is not trustworthy because
Southern ¯rms tend to undermine labelling standards to save costs, but
they tend to undermine Northern standards in order to compete via
prices against the home bias. This result is also important, because for
the Northern ¯rm there is no way to in°uence, control or monitor the
Southern labelling costs. Neither has it direct command of the home
bias. Thus, there is a strong incentive for the Southern ¯rm to o®er a la-
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belled good which has very low labelling standards, while this behaviour
contributes to the Northern ¯rm's 'reputational' comparative advantage
(see Basu et al. 2004: 136). These results are similar to the problem
of adverse selection in the vertical di®erentiation models, e.g. by Jansen
and de Faria (2002).
Under mutual recognition, a social planner would consider the North-
ern ¯rm's pro¯ts, net consumer surplus, the warm glow and transporta-
tion cost. Her choice of the labelling criteria, however, would not di®er
from the ¯rm's choice. Since the consumers include the bene¯ts from
labels in their demand function, all relevant environmental factors are
assumed to be considered at the ¯rm level. Moreover, and as stated in
Spence (1975), the consumers identical willingness to pay assumption
contributes to this result, because marginal and average willingness to
pay are identical.
If there is only one harmonised single subject label in the market,
and both ¯rms accept this tool, we ¯nd that the ¯rms di®erentiation
stems solely from the costs of labelling as harmonisation abolishes the
home bias. Each ¯rm compares pro¯ts with a label on the one hand,
and pro¯ts without a label on the other hand. As long as the marginal
willingness to pay - stemming from warm glow - is larger than marginal
abatement cost, ¯rms would adopt the harmonised label. Due to the
strategic interaction of ¯rms, no one ¯rm would refrain from using a
label. Labelling is a dominant strategy.
More interesting results are driven by the home bias. First, for the
Southern ¯rm that is exporting all its output to the North, even the har-
monisation at the Northern labelling level could be an optimal choice.
Second, welfare analysis of a harmonised labelling programme shows that
a social planner would set stricter labelling criteria compared to the mu-
tual recognition case, if the di®erence in labelling costs is su±ciently
large. In this case, the result of the negotiations about a harmonised
label will be ine±cient if the mutual recognition labels serve as upper
and lower bounds. This implies that in the speci¯c setting of no exter-
nalities but a warm glow of consumers, only an international institution
that is able to enforce a common labelling programme would implement
e±cient labels. The mere cooperation of the Northern and the Southern
government would not yield a welfare maximising result.
Finally, the externalities need some more elaboration. Beyond the
warm glow one could assume negative welfare e®ects for the global envi-
ronment stemming from the PPMs, e.g. damage from emissions. How-
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ever, such considerations need a di®erent modelling tool. The horizontal
product di®erentiation model assumes that each consumer buys one good.
If the technology is ¯xed, each unit of externality that is caused by the
production of goods can be reduced by producing less. Yet, here reducing
the number of goods means reducing the number of consumers. Never-
theless, an increase in labelling criteria can be assumed to deliver higher
standards in pollution prevention and control. From our ¯ndings above,
and given the limits of the model, this implies a better internalisation
under harmonisation and with a social planner.
Crucial to the e®ectiveness of labels is of course, that consumers have
the desire to contribute to a better environment. The prerequisite for
the success of eco-labels with respect to their environmental impacts
therefore is education and information. Moreover, the home bias and the
protectionist chill it implies, can not only be cured by harmonisation, but
also if under mutual recognition better information is delivered to the
Northern consumer. This is a basic problem of producers in developing
countries and needs to be addressed in the context of the WTO Doha
Development round mandate on eco-labels.
3 Conclusions
Ecological labels are a market-based policy instrument which helps to
overcome information asymmetries between consumers and producers.
Especially, labels can inform about the environmental background of a
product which includes its processes and production methods (PPMs).
This makes labels an e®ective tool to di®erentiate homogeneous prod-
ucts according to their production impact on the global environment.
Many developing countries, however, regard labelling as an attempt to
erect new trade barriers for their export goods. Accordingly, ecological
labels are a disputed issue under the negotiations of the WTO's Doha
Development Round.
One feature that underlines the developing countries argument is sub-
ject to our analysis, namely, that the consumers' environmental aware-
ness and perception of labelling information could di®er with respect to
domestic and to foreign suppliers. We started from the idea that con-
sumers can experience a warm glow from buying 'green', also known as
impure altruism. Consumers' awareness creates a higher willingness to
pay which induces ¯rms to di®erentiate 'like products' into green and
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polluting versions. However, even with a label that provides information
on all aspects of a products' life cycle, an information problem persists
vis-a-vis foreign labels and consumers are biased. Using a horizontal
product di®erentiation model with a Northern and a Southern producer
we ¯nd that consumers' taste for a label would induce ¯rms to use this
tool, because it determines their market position. We have also taken
into account that Northern consumers face a lack of information about
the Southern label and this creates a home bias. If there is a regime of
mutual recognition, the equilibrium outcome depends on how the home
bias is related to the cost di®erentials between the ¯rms. Under mu-
tual recognition the Northern ¯rm can gain from the consumers' home
bias. This can only be compensated for by the Southern ¯rm if it has a
cost advantage that is high enough compared to the consumers' bias to-
wards the Northern good. Thus, we ¯nd a trade-o® between consumers'
environmental awareness and the goods' prices. Harmonisation, on the
other hand, would abolish the discrimination of the Southern product on
the demand side and the market equilibrium would only depend on how
¯rms' cost would be a®ected by the label. The ¯rm facing the higher
labelling cost will loose market share and pro¯t. A social planner would
set the labelling criteria higher under harmonisation than under mutual
recognition given that one ¯rm has lower labelling costs and given that
the cost di®erence is su±ciently large. Moreover, we ¯nd that harmon-
isation at the importing countries' level could yield an optimal solution
for the exporting ¯rm.
Additionally, and in line with Eriksson (2004), we can argue that a
home bias could be reduced if education and information of the importing
countries' consumers about foreign labels would become better and more
homogenous compared to the information on Northern labels. This would
contribute to making labels a more e®ective policy tool for pollution
control.
Labels can be regarded as a tool which promotes international envi-
ronmental protection without compromising the trade rules. However, in
the perception of developing countries { and most likely also in the real
world of trade °ows { labels may act as a barrier to trade for comparable
products not receiving an importing country's domestic label. Never-
theless, developing countries with strong dependence on export markets
should consider a cooperation with importing countries on giving product
information also on the processes and production methods. This could
be conducted through both, mutual recognition agreements or a har-
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monised labelling programme. The arguments we are stressing from the
analytical point of view are, ¯rst, that developing countries should not
dismiss harmonisation from the outset and, second, a credible institution
is needed to coordinate the application of labels, and this should be inte-
grated in and acknowledged by the international trade regime. In order
to ¯nd practicable and e±cient solutions, the implementation of labelling
coordination that serves both, developing and industrial countries, needs




A.1 Welfare Analysis under Harmonisation of La-
bels
Welfare (38) can be rearranged to show that total costs C consist of
production cost PC and transportation cost TC.
W
h = s + b(¹ a) ¡ ([c1(¹ a)^ x














Inserting (33) and (34) implies for total costs C
C = PC+TC = [
1
2
(c1(¹ a) + c2(¹ a)) ¡
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Therefore, total costs decrease if ¢ > 18=10. But when total costs de-
crease, marginal bene¯ts b0(¹ a) must decrease too, requiring a higher la-
belling level.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
a) Due to the assumed strict convexity of the labelling costs, c1(a) > c2(a)
implies c0
1(a) > c0
2(a). With mutual recognition, the chosen labels are
b0(aN) = c0
1(aN) and b0(aS) = c0
2(aS). If the harmonised label is stricter
than the Northern label, ¹ a > aN, then b0(¹ a) < b0(aN).
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On the LHS, the ¯rst bracketed term is negative due to the assumption
c1(¹ a) > c2(¹ a), and the second bracketed term is positive, therefore the
LHS is negative. But if aN > ¹ a, c1(aN) > c1(¹ a) and c0
1(aN) > c0
1(¹ a),
therefore the RHS is positive, which yields a contradiction. Therefore,
aN > ¹ a is not possible.
For the comparison with the Southern label, suppose the contrary, i.e.
¹ a < aS, which would imply b0(¹ a) > b0(aS) = c0
2(aS). Inserting (39) and
substracting c0
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The RHS is positive if aS > ¹ a. The second bracket on the LHS is positive,
therefore if the term in the ¯rst bracket is negative, a contradiction arises.
Su±cient for this is 1
2 ¡ 5
18(c1(¹ a) ¡ c2(¹ a)) < 0 or c1(¹ a) ¡ c2(¹ a) > 18
10.
Therefore, if the di®erence in labelling costs is su±ciently high, ¹ a < aS
is not possible.
b) For the comparison with the Southern label under mutual recognition,
suppose the contrary, ¹ a < aS, which would imply b0(¹ a) > b0(aS) = c0
2(aS).
Inserting (39), substracting c0
2(¹ a) from both sides and rearranging terms
gives again (A.7). As before, the RHS is positive. On the LHS, the
second bracket is negative due to c1(a) < c2(a), and the ¯rst bracketed
term is positive, which implies the contradiction. Therefore, ¹ a < aS is
not possible.
For the comparison with the Northern label, suppose the contrary,
¹ a < aN, which would imply b0(¹ a) > b0(aN) = c0
1(aN). Inserting (39),
substracting c0
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The RHS is positive, the second bracket on the LHS is negative. There-
fore, if the term in the ¯rst bracket is positive, a contradiction will result.
Su±cient for this is c2(¹ a) ¡ c1(¹ a) > 18
10.
c) Follows directly from (33) and (34) as a condition for a corner solution.
A.3 Numerical Example
We use as cost functions in the North and in the South c1(¹ a) =
(¹ a)2
2 and
c2(¹ a) = À
(¹ a)2
2 , with ci(0) = 0, c0
i > 0 and c00
i > 0. À determines the
degree of cost di®erences between labelling activities in the two coun-
tries. If both countries introduce labels, there are three cases for the cost
functions, depending on the cost parameter À.
1. 0 < À < 1 ) c1(¹ a) > c2(¹ a)
2. À = 1 ) c1(¹ a) = c2(¹ a)
3. 1 < À < 2 ) c1(¹ a) > c2(¹ a)
We have for the social planner's warm glow WGh = b(¹ a) =
p
¹ a, and
inserting the relevant numbers into (38) we have
W
h = ¾










(1 + À): (A.9)
The welfare maximising label ¹ a¤ depends on the cost di®erence À between
North and South caused by a labelling programme. Moreover we have
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